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IN GENERAL TERMS there is little doubt that the present Inter-
national Court of Justice represents a direct continuation of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. An important feature
which gives a distinct character to the new Court, however, is the
diverse backgrounds of the judges. Since its inception, at least two
judges from socialist countries have sat continuously on the new
Court, and at times their number has risen to three or four.' The
socialist judges are set apart as a group from their colleagues on the
Court by a variety of factors. They come from countries in close
alliance with the Soviet Union and follow a policy of economic and
social reconstruction allegedly in accordance with a pattern deter-
mined by the October revolution. Although reared in a legal tradi-
tion which, like the legal systems of Western Europe, has roots in
romanistic jurisprudence, their countries have developed a new legal
technique and approach to problems of social order. Thus, when
key legal issues come before the Court, the socialist judges are in-
clined to present a common view which differs sharply from the
opinion of the non-socialist majority. This characteristic of their
participation in the work of the International Court of Justice pro-
vides a comprehensive socialist doctrine on some of the basic issues
of the rule of law in the international community of sovereign
nations.
The socialist judges share common views on the position of the
sovereign state in international law, on the role of international
organizations, and on collective action. They also share a common
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judge Winiarski of Poland has served since 1946 and has been President of the
Court since 1961. Judges Krylov, Golunsky and Kojevnikov of the Soviet Union
served during the years 1946-1952, 1952-1953, and 1953-1961, respectively. Judge
Zori di of Yugoslavia served during the period 1946-1957. Judge Koretzky of the
Ukrainian S.S.R. has been on the bench since 1961.
Two judges ad hoc were chosen by Albania in the Corfu Channel Case, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 4: M. Doxner who sat on the bench when the preliminary objection was
heard, and M. Eer of Czechoslovakia, who sat when the case was heard on the merits.
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understanding of the judicial function and of its limitations in
settling disputes between independent nations. Together their views
on these topics represent an outlook in deep contrast to the main
thrust of juristic thinking of the Court.
I
One basic principle upon which the socialist judges have con-
tinually insisted is that national sovereignty, as both a legal and a
political principle, continues to be the keystone of relationships be-
tween independent states within the international community. It
is essential to understand, according to their view, that the creation
of the United Nations has produced no basic change in the legal
position of the member states. The new international organization
merely represents a new framework for old values, and consequently
the techniques of international relations remain centered around the
sovereign state. Legally, the sovereign state controls and limits col-
lective action, whether conceived within or without international
organizations. As Judge Zorii6, of Yugoslavia, stated in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Admission of a State Case:
The permanent member [of the Security Council] in question, rightly
or wrongly, maintained its interpretation of the Declaration of Potsdam
and of the peace treaties. For that member, these instruments involved
an obligation on signatory States to support applications for admission.
... It goes without saying that the co-signatories of these instruments
were free to accept this interpretation or not. What is decisive, for the
question before the Court, is not the correctness of the interpretation
made by that State, but the right of that State to rely on it .... This
right is guaranteed by the principle of the sovereign equality of States
which underlies the organization of the United Nations .... It follows
that the member in question was juridically entitled to maintain its
interpretation and there for to call for the simultaneous admission of
the ex-enemy States.2
The significance of this statement lies in Judge Zorii6's assertion
that the Court lacks power to correct an error in the interpretation
of an international obligation by a sovereign state, even though that
state is a member of an international organization, in this case the
United Nations Security Council, and participates in the decisions
of its organs. This view was developed to its logical conclusion by
Judge Krylov, of the Soviet Union, who insisted that the Court had
2Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1948] I.CJ. Rep. 57, 106 (advisory
opinion).
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no right to give an opinion on the question whether a state's under-
standing of a treaty provision was right or wrong, as that would
amount to a censure of the reasons given by the state for its position
in the deliberations of the Security Council. However, the state's
interpretation of the treaty provision would have no bearing on the
state's duty to conform to the Court's legal opinion."
The basic proposition that membership in the United Nations
organization has not vitally affected the sovereign rights of member
nations, even within the context of the organization, was restated
by Judge Winiarski, of Poland, in the Expenses Case.4 The judge
distinguished between a formal and a substantive validity of the
decisions of the United Nations' organs, a distinction which he con-
sidered particularly applicable to the decisions of the General As-
sembly: "[T]he Assembly... interprets the Charter by applying it and
its interpretation is final. This is true to a certain extent and partic-
ularly where its interpretation has been generally accepted by Mem-
ber States."5 Judge Winiarski indicated, furthermore, that the collec-
tive aspect of the participation of individual nations in the United
Nations is resolved into a number of separate relationships which
depend upon each member's acceptance of the collective decision of
the United Nations' bodies. Membership in the United Nations,
therefore, does not involve a duty to support its policy. To gain this
support, the United Nations policy must become the national policy.
Sometimes it may become necessary to make a choice between up-
holding the aims of the United Nations and the principle of national
sovereignty of member states. It seems to be Judge Winiarski's view
that, in both legal and political terms, in the case of such a conflict,
national sovereignty is a more important feature of the present inter-
national system than the aims of the United Nations. He argues that
each member state has a right to reject the decision of the United
Nations' organs, even when that decision was adopted by a proper
majority and was authorized by the Charter:
It is sometimes difficult to attribute any precise legal significance to
the conduct of the contracting parties, because it is not always possible
to know with certainty whether they have acted in a certain manner
because they consider that the law so requires or allows, or for reasons
of expediency. However, in the case referred to the Court, it is estab-
3Id. at 107.
' Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.CJ. Rep. 151 (advisory opinion).
rId. at 229.
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lished that some at least of the Member States refuse to comply with the
decisions of the General Assembly because they dispute the conformity
of those decisions with the Charter. Apparently they are of opinion that
the resolutions cannot be relied upon as against them although they
may be valid and binding in respect of other States. What is therefore
involved is the validity of the Assembly's resolutions in respect of those
States, or the right to rely upon them as against those States.
It has been said that the nullity of a legal instrument can be relied
upon only when there has been a finding of nullity by a competent
tribunal. .... In the international legal system, however, there is, in
the absence of agreement to the contrary, no tribunal competent to make
a finding of nullity. It is the State which regards itself as the injured
party which itself rejects a legal instrument vitiated, in its opinion, by
such defects as to render it a nullity. Such a decision is obviously a grave
one and one to which resort can be had only in exceptional cases, but
one which is nevertheless sometimes inevitable and which is recognized
as such by general international law.6
This right to reject a United Nations decision extends also to the
right .of each nation, at its discretion, to recognize or reject an arbi-
tral award or a judicial decision. The adjudication may be rejected
if the member state deems it to be contrary to 'the rules of inter-
national law, as Judge Winiarski stated in his dissent to the advisory
opinion in the Effect of Awards Case:7
An arbitral award, which is always final and without appeal, may be
vitiated by defects which make it void; in this event, a party to the arbi-
tration will be justified in refusing to give effect to it. This is not by
virtue of any rule peculiar to ordinary arbitration between States; it is
a natural and inevitable application of a general principle existing in
all law: not only a judment, but any act is incapable of producing legal
effects if it is legally null and void.8
In effect, the principles which bind members of the United Nations
are identical with those which bind members of the international
community at large. The object of these principles of international
law, and of the United Nations Charter, is to protect the independ-
ent and sovereign status of each state. The continued existence of
international organizations depends, therefore, upon the support of
each member, and though the rule of unanimity may be abrogated
and replaced by a simple majority vote, still the unanimity rule is
Ord. at 230.7 Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the U.S. Administrative Tribunal,
[1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47 (advisory opinion).
8 Id. at 65.
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supported by the doctrine of formal and substantive validity. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that socialist judges favor treaties or
international conventions as instruments creating mutual rights and
obligations between members of the international community and
as sources of legal rules.9 And for the same kind of reason, Judge
Krylov refused to employ analogy so as to apply a general principle
of international law to a new but similar fact situation.10
Since the socialist system, in its legal arrangements and institu-
tions, favors the sovereign nation over -the decisions of collective
bodies, it seems natural that it would restrict the use of arbitration
or judicial process strictly to situations where the adjudicative power
is exercised with the full consent of the parties. International order
and peace cannot be achieved through law enforcement. The proper
means for resolving conflicting interests is through negotiation,
bargaining, mutual accommodation, and in the final analysis through
the use of power. Thus where doubt arises as to whether a state
has consented to a judicial settlement of its rights, the doubt should
be resolved by presuming that the state has not accepted the princi-
ple of judicial accountability."
The ultimate in the state-centered approach to the role of inter-
national bodies was reached in Judge Winiarski's separate opinion
in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case.12 Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania refused to cooperate with the other two signatories to
the Peace Treaties, the United Kingdom and the United States, in
establishing an arbitral commission to resolve disputes concerning
the interpretation of the Peace Treaties. The question was sub-
mitted to the United Nations General Assembly, which requested
the International Court of Justice to give an Advisory Opinion in
order to clarify a certain legal point before the Assembly made its
recommendations. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania again refused
to cooperate, this time failing to participate in the proceedings be-
0 Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.CJ. Rep. 4. "Contrary to the opinion of the majority
of the judges, I consider that there is no such thing as a common regulation of the
legal regime of straits. Every strait is regulated individually. That applies to the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to the Sound and the Belts, to the Strait of Magellan,
etc. The legal regime of all these straits is defined by the respective international
conventions. . . . If the r6gime of the strait is not defined by a multilateral con-
vention, it appertains to the coastal State or States to regulate it." Id. at 74.
1 0Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 174, 217 (advisory opinion).
11 South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319, 453 (preliminary objections).
22 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 89 (advisory opinion).
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fore the Court. Judge Winiarski stated in his separate opinion that
the Court would violate basic rules of international law if it com-
plied with the General Assembly's request, since an advisory opin-
ion in this case would be "a judgment delivered without the consent
of the interested parties" and, furthermore:
[T]he Court is pronouncing on the interpretation and application
of the jurisdictional clauses of the Peace Treaties, and this in the
first place is the prerogative of the high contracting parties themselves;
the Court could not do so without their consent or, at least as a general
rule, without their participation. The Court heard the interpretation
and the conclusions of the United States and the United Kingdom; it
did not hear statements by the three States.' 3
In the same vein, Judge Winiarski continued by suggesting that
protection of the sovereign rights of independent states constitutes
the supreme value of the law of nations.' 4
The dominant role of national sovereignty in international rela-
tions, of course, limits the interference of international organizations
in the internal affairs of the socialist world. The socialist view also
extends domestic concepts of jurisdiction and of national sovereignty
to include even the situations covered by international agreements,
and decisions of judicial bodies or arbitral tribunals. In the final
analysis it is the state's specific acceptance which gives validity to the
decisions of international bodies, whether political or judicial.
II
In the gradual shift of authority within the United Nations from
the Security Council to the General Assembly, the socialist judges,
together with the other members of -the Court, faced one of the
most crucial issues affecting the United Nations. The Court's role
in this process of change has been indirect, coming through requests
for advisory opinions. The Expenses Case, typical of this type, arose
in part out of a peace-keeping operation which was initiated and
conducted under the authority of the General Assembly, rather than
the Security Council. The Soviet Union, unable to prevent the
initiative of the General Assembly declared that:
[I]t regards the proposal for the establishment by the General Assem-
bly of an international force to be stationed on Egyptian territory, a
proposal which bypasses the Security Council, as contrary to the United
23 Id. at 94.
"I Id. at 96.
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Nations Charter. However, in view of the fact that in this instance the
victim of aggression has been compelled to agree to the introduction of
the international force, in the hope that this may prevent any further
extension of the aggression, the Soviet delegation did not vote against
the draft resolution, but abstained.' 5
The socialist members of the Court have unanimously opposed
the shift in authority from the Council to the Assembly. Judge
Winiarski, in the Expenses Case, emphasized that it had not been
the intention of the drafters of the Charter that the United Nations
organization should be able to act under all and any circumstances. 10
Judge Koretsky, of the Soviet Union, dissenting in the same case,
stated that the majority opinion, which affirmed the legal validity
of the apportionment of the peace-keeping expenses under article
17 (2) of the Charter, misconceived the principles of the Charter.
When there has been no Security Council decision on peace-keeping,
he wrote, the General Assembly action is fundamentally illegal, since
such action is primarily within the Council's jurisdiction. In con-
trast to the General Assembly, which has power only to make recom-
mendations possessing no binding force, the Security Council has
the authority to make concrete arrangementsY
Judge Winiarski, in his dissenting opinion, devoted his attention
to the study of the budgetary techniques of the United Nations
organization and, within this context, developed the theory that the
powers of the General Assembly are highly circumscribed. He was
ready to admit that the General Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction
in budgetary matters and that its decisions in this respect are bind-
ing upon all members of the United Nations. However, he asserted,
budgetary decisions made under article 17 (1) of the Charter are
binding only upon those members who accept the decision when it
is made in connection with recommendations issued by the General
Assembly concerning peace-keeping operations. Judge Winiarski
wrote:
[I]f it be recognized that the expenditures enumerated in the request
constitute expenses of the Organization, inevitably the question arises
whether participation in these expenses is obligatory for all Member
States, as appears to be suggested by the question in the request and as
is accepted in the Opinion. And yet it is apparent that the resolutions
25 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 260 (advisory
opinion).
"ld. at 230.17 Id. at 287.
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approving and apportioning these expenses are valid and binding only
in respect of the Member States which have accepted the recommenda-
tions.18
This reasoning was unavoidable, in Judge Winiarski's view, because
of the action of the General Assembly in upsetting the internal
balance of the United Nations organization. A cautious approach
is required in the interpretation of the Charter provisions since it
is "a multilateral treaty .. . the result of prolonged and laborous
negotiations, [which] carefully created organs and determined their
competence and means of action."'19
The United Nations Secretary-General was also criticized be-
cause, in Judge Koretsky's opinion, he had assumed functions be-
yond the role assigned to him by the Charter. Specifically, the
Secretary-General had actively contributed to the execution of the
General Assembly's recommendations and directly influenced United
Nations policy, a function not in accord with his duties as chief ad-
ministrative officer of the organization.2 0
III
Two aspects of the judicial power of the International Court of
Justice were differently conceived from those of the Permanent
Court. Under article 36 of the United Nations Charter, the Security
28 Id. at 233. For an expose of the Soviet position in the controversy concerning
the interpretation of article 4 of the Charter in connection with the General Assembly's
request for an Advisory Opinion concerning "Conditions of Admission of a State to
the Membership of the United Nations," see VISHINSKII, VOPROSY MEZHDUNARODNOGO
PRAVA I MEZHDUNARODNOI POLITIKI, 280-93, 358-65 (1951).
According to Professor Krylov, the sovereign equality of UN members finds ex-
pression in the fact that each country has only one vote. The fact that some decisions
of the United Nations' organs are made by the majority vote does not affect this
sovereignty. As the General Assembly makes only recommendations, such recommenda-
tions do not establish binding obligations on those nations which do not accept them.
Furthermore, those decisions which were imposed by the mechanical majority of vote
upon the dissenting minority, if its interests are in accordance with the aims and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, must be regarded as deprived of
legal force. The minority have the right to reject those decisions, a proper recourse
in defense of their interests. KRYLOV, ISTORIA SOZDANIA ORGANIZATSII OBJEDINONNIKH
NATsir, 162 (1962).
10 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 230.
20 1d. at 254-55. It is the considered opinion of Soviet scholars that within the
United Nations organization, the Security Council is in charge of most important
functions, such as preservation of peace and the formulation of UN policy. The
General Assembly is reduced to a secondary role and in some circumstances must act
only upon recommendation from the Security Council. See the highly authoritative
1957 edition of the MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAvo 321, 325 (Akademia Nayuk USSR;
Institut Prava, Moskva 1957).
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Council is entitled to recommend that the parties refer their dispute
to the International Court in accordance with its Statute. Also,
under article 96 of the Charter and article 65 of the Statute, the
Court is charged with advisory functions, in response to requests
from the main bodies of the United Nations.21 Advisory opinions
have no binding force, except when given in connection with the
decisions of the administrative tribunals of the UN and the Inter-
national Labor Organization. 22
On only one occasion has the Security Council implemented its
powers under article 36 of the Charter. On April 9, 1947, the Coun-
cil recommended that Albania and Great Britain submit their dis-
pute concerning certain events in the Corfu Channel to the Inter-
national Court of Justice. The British government initiated the
case with a unilateral application, claiming that the Security Council
recommendation under article 86 had established the competence of
the Court to decide the case. The Albanian government challenged
this view on the grounds that neither the provisions of the Charter,
nor the Statute of the Court, nor recognized principles of inter-
national law warranted such a claim. Albania further contended
that the British government was not entitled to bring the case with-
out first concluding a special agreement with Albania. However,
after stating its objections in principle, the Albanian government
accepted the Court's jurisdiction.23
21 In addition to the Security Council, General Assembly, Social and Economic
Council and Trusteeship Council, various other international bodies such as UNESCO,
the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, etc., were
given the right to seek the Court's assistance in the solution of their legal problems.
22 See ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 37-39, 43-50, 487-92 (1957).
Cf. U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-93. One of the Soviet scholars stated that the Soviet Union
is, as matter of principle, opposed to the idea of compulsory jurisdiction for the
International Court of Justice under article 36, para. 2 of the Court's Statute: "This
is explained by the fact that jurisdiction of this type, which is a priori established
with regard to all possible disputes, may lead to the violation of sovereign rights
of the states, as not every dispute concerning the interpretation of an international
treaty between the states concerned may be resolved usefully by the International
Court, without jeopardizing their interests. And therefore, the Soviet Union insists
that only concrete disputes may be submitted to court's jurisdiction on the basis
of mutual agreement of the contracting parties, in accordance with Article 36 para.
1 of the Statute. And whenever during international conferences the point of includ-
ing in a convention an article which would provide for the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court was raised, the Soviet Union was always opposed to it,
and in case of necessity made reservations stating its rejection of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court." SHURSHALOV, OSNOVNYE VOPROSY TEORI
NMEZHDUNARODNOGO DOGOvORA 452 (1959).
2' Corfu Channel Case, [1947] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 5.
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The majority of the judges considered that there was no pre-
liminary objection to the Court's jurisdiction. The minority, which
included three socialist judges, concurred with the majority in the
view that the Court had jurisdiction, but considered that, because
of its importance, the question of the nature of the recommendation
under article 36 of the Charter should be clarified. The minority
noted that the question of compulsory jurisdiction under article 36
had been discussed and that the British government, in particular,
had insisted upon its right to bring the case by means of a unilateral
application. The minority considered that the Court should declare
itself in favor of the traditional viewpoint, that despite the recom-
mendation under article 36, the Court's jurisdiction depended ex-
clusively upon the agreement between the parties.24 In addition,
Judge Duxner held the opinion that Albanian acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction did not establish the Court's competence to de-
cide the case on the merits, since without the formal special agree-
ment, there was no case.25 As the question of jurisdiction was not
an issue in the dispute, any judicial pronouncement interpreting
article 86 of the Charter would have been mere theoretical specula-
tion under any theory of judicial precedent.
The question of the new scope of the advisory function, in view
of article 96 of the Charter and of article 65 of the Statute, has
received considerable attention from the socialist judges on the
Court. Indeed, it is on this fundamental issue that the views of the
majority have been severely criticized by ,the socialists. The discus-
sion has revolved mainly around the extent to which the present
Court is bound by the precedent established by the Permanent
2'Corfu Channel Case, [1948] I.CJ. Rep. 15, 31. Judges Basdevant, Alvarez,
Winiarski, Zoriic', de Visscher, Badawi Pasha and Krylov joined in a separate opinion,
stating that "[W]e were faced here with a procedure which, regarded as a whole, is
the outcome of an innovation in the Charter of the United Nations. Under the
regime of the Charter, the rule holds good that the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, as of the Permanent Court of International Justice before it,
depends on the consent of the States Parties to a dispute. But Article 36 of the
Charter has made it possible for the Security Council to recommend the Parties to
refer their dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Court's Statute. The Security Council, for the first time, availed itself
of this power on April 9th, 1947. The contentious procedure, recourse to which the
Security Council thus recommended, involves, in order that the Court may be seized
of the case, certain action by the parties or, possibly, by one of them. Faced with
this new solution, the Governments concerned had different views as to the effect of
the recommendation and, consequently, as to the method to be adopted in bringing
the case before the Court."
2
r d. at 42.
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Court. In his dissenting opinion in the Interpretation of Peace
Treaties Case,26 Judge Winiarski insisted that the International
Court is bound by the basic rules which governed the advisory pro-
cedure under the Permanent Court, which were that "in regard to
advisory opinions, the Court should proceed in all respects in the
same way as in contentious cases." 27 Also, Judge Winiarski stated,
"above all the principles of judicial procedure, is the principle of
international law according to which 'no State can, without its con-
sent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to
mediation or arbitration.' ",28 The danger of an advisory opinion
is that it may be used to assist in the settlement of a dispute between
States, a purpose for which it was not designed:
[A]n advisory opinion which is concerned with a dispute between
States from a legal point of view amounts to a definitive decision upon
the existence or non-existence of the legal relations, which is the subject
of the dispute. It follows that the opinion cannot fail to exercise very
great influence on the respective legal positions of the States, all the
more so because the opinion may be used as a means of psychological
pressure upon the governments of the States concerned.29
The socialist judges have also differed with their colleagues as
to what legal questions are suitable for advisory opinions. The ma-
jority has asserted the Court's right and duty to render an advisory
opinion.without specific reference to the conditions under which a
dispute between states could be entertained. Thus, in acceding to
the General Assembly's request to clarify a legal point in the Inter-
pretation of Peace Treaties Case, the Court rejected the argument
that its advisory opinion would interfere with a sovereign state's
domestic affairs in contravention of article 2 (7) of the United Na-
tions Charter, since the matter concerned a question of international
law.30 Judge Koretsky, in his dissent in the Expenses Case, enjoined
the majority from adopting such an approach:
The Court must not -shut its eyes to reality. The image of Themis
with her eyes blindfolded is only an image from a fairy-tale and from
20 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65.
27 1d. at 90.
28 Ibid. Cf. ROSENNE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 40.
29Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 101-02 (advisory
opinion) (Zoriad J., dissenting); Cf. id. at 111 (Krylov, J., dissenting). Judgments
of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints made against the
UNESCO, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77, 105-06 (dissenting opinion).
80 Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, supra note 29, at 70-71.
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mythology. The Court, taking reality into consideration, should at the
same time have in mind the strict observation of the Charter.3 1
Judge Zorii6 made a similar appeal in the Conditions of Admission
Case, expressing the wish that his colleagues be mindful of the politi-
cal implications of an advisory opinion.32 Judge Krylov, in his dis-
senting opinion in the same case, also emphasized that political
questions, even if couched in legal terms, were outside the compe-
tence of the Court. He cited the Permanent Court's practice of
considering only concrete disputes and the fact that "during the
eighteen years of its activity ... [the Permanent Court] was never
asked to give an advisory opinion regarding any article of the
Covenant of the League of Nations in abstracto," the reasons for
which, Judge Krylov concluded, were that "it was not desired to
involve the Permanent Court in political disputes."3 3 He also raised
the objection that an opinion rendered in reply to a political ques-
tion expressed in abstract form, will have a "quasi-legislative effect,
and this ... is in no way desirable." 34
The majority's reply to these criticisms is well expressed in the
Conditions of Admission Case:
It has.., been contended that the question put must be regarded
as a political one and that, for this reason, it falls outside the jurisdiction
of the Court. The Court cannot attribute a political character to a re-
quest which, framed in abstract terms, invites it,to undertake an essential-
ly judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision....
It has also been contended that the Court should not deal with a
question couched in ,abstract terms.. That "is a mere ifirmation devoid
of any justification. According to Article 96 of the Charter and Article
65 of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion pn. any legal
question, abstract or otherwise.35  ...
The minority and majority used the same terms, but spoke a differ-
ent language, The majority was concerned with its competence as
a body of jurists" to consider a legal question. The socialist minority
spoke of the political effect of a juristic treatment of a juristic prob-
lem: That the law is on anybody's side is a powerful' argument, and
in that sense any decision of the Court is political, as is the judgment
of any municipal court which deals with the legal limitations of the
31Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 268.
32 Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, 106.
1"I1d. at 108.
"Id. at 107-08.
"Id. at 61.
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exercise of power. The socialist judges realize the potential of ad-
visory opinions, and by insisting that the exercise of this function
conform strictly to the conditions under which a contentious pro-
ceeding may be brought before the Court, they have sought to pre-
vent the possibility of a judicial pronouncement upon matters of
vital concern for the socialist members of the international com-
munity.
IV
The socialist judges, despite their differences with the majority,
have been prepared to make accommodations with the sensibilities
of their colleagues. Such concessions were necessary in order for
there to be any useful participation by the socialist judges in the
Court's work. By way of such concession, the socialist judges have
failed to advance the theory of Soviet scholars that the United Na-
tions Charter belongs to that category of legal instruments which do
not lend themselves to judicial interpretation. The Charter, accord-
ing to Soviet theory, states the conditions of the participation of the
socialist states in world affairs in an organized system, is a key docu-
ment for East-West relations, and, therefore, falls into this separate
category.3 6 Such a doctrine, the socialist judges realized, would
16During the discussion of the draft of the Australian resolution providing for
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all matters
concerning interpretation of the Charter, the Soviet delegation asserted that this
right may be exclusively exercised by the organs of the United Nations, which have
the obligation to enforce the provisions of the Charter and therefore, have the
exclusive right of its authentic interpretation. Soviet scholars maintain that interpre-
tations of the Charter by the International Court are not authentic, as they are not
compulsory. Cf. SHuasHALov, op. cit. supra note 23, at 453; DELtEATSIt SSSR, USSR I
BSSR NA vTOROI sEssii GENERALNOi ASSEMBLEI ORGANIZATSII OBJEDINONNIKH NATSII
548-49 (1948).
While Soviet legal scholars admit to the possibility that a legal question including
the interpretation of the UN Charter may be submitted to the Court, they are of
the opinion that the International Court of Justice should not interpret the Charter
without such a request. Shurshalov has stated that "it is impermissible that the
International Court should interpret the Charter without the request of the com-
petent organs of UNO or against their will. In such a case it would be put above
the General Assembly or the Security Council, which would result in discrediting of
those important organs, as in the question of the interpretation and application of
the Charter of the United Nations Organization the General Assembly and the
Security Council would seem to be less competent and qualified than the Interna-
tional Court." SHURSHALOV, op. cit. supra note 23, at 453-54. Another Soviet scholar
was convinced that "in this connection it is necessary to touch upon the problem
what organs have the right to interpret the Charter of the United Nations. This
right belongs in the first place to the Security Council and also to the General
Assembly, as they are those main organs of UNO, which in the first place arc called
upon to enforce the Charter which is impossible without its correct understanding
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hamper their cooperation within the framework established by the
Statute of the Court.
However, in their attempt to limit the influence and political
function of the rule of law in international relations, their doctrines
seem highly unrealistic. The socialist judges seem to overlook 'the
fact that in international relations, just as at all other levels of social
relationships, the rule of law has a dual function. It is designed to
protect individual existence, such as the institution of national
sovereignty and the rights of states, and to shape social cooperation.
To be effective in the first dimension, law must be effective in the
second. The United Nations functions in a world of flux, in which
the changes in the relative strengths of the great powers and of
political and military blocs present new barriers to, as well as new
opportunities for, international cooperation. The needs of the
present have partially disrupted the carefully prepared and skillfully
negotiated plans of East-West relations, as well as the distribution of
responsibilities within the United Nations. The world, as the social-
ist judges see it, is the world of the initial years of the United Na-
tions, when it had just emerged after the horrors of the Second
World War. But it is not the Rame world, and the Court, the United
Nations and the law of the world community must develop and
progress if they are to overcome the challenges with which they are
faced.
and interpretation. To the Security Council in this connection belongs undisputed
priority, as the unanimity principle of the permanent members of the Council has
the role of safeguarding and guaranteeing the coordination of contrasting viewpoints
of states of differing social orders. This principle should also be followed in cases
involving the interpretation of the Charter by the General Assembly. It is illegal to
impose upon one group of states an interpretation established by a mechanical
majority, just as imposing such decisions which are convenient to one group of
nations only." MoRozov, ORGANIZATSIA OBJEDINONNIKH NATsIi 206 (1962).
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